Natural resources of all kinds have been overexploited by user groups who cannot or will not develop rules to constrain their own exploitive efforts. One notable exception is the Maine lobster industry, where an effective set of conservation laws has been developed due, in great part, to the strong support of the industry. In the early decades of the 20th century, however, the lobster industry was marked by widespread violations of the existing conservation laws and opposition to developing more. This article explores the way that the pirate ethic gave way to the conservation ethic in the 1930s. The authors’ explorations in evolutionary game theory suggest that this change was produced by three factors: costs and benefits of defection from the conservation ethic; numbers of people accepting the conservation ethic quality rule; and events that shocked the system from one state to another. They argue that the shock to the system in the late 1920s and 1930s was caused by massive stock failure which changed the attitudes of many fishermen about the need for conservation. People began to report violations of the law, which made law enforcement more effective and quickly led to a cascade of fishermen abandoning the pirate ethic. In the late 1930s, increasing catches, in combination with a number of other social, technical, and economic factors continued the upward spiral.